Chile Se Moviliza: Protest Movements and Inequality in Post-Dictatorship Chile by Jaishankar, Shruti
University of Mississippi 
eGrove 
Honors Theses Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College) 
2014 
Chile Se Moviliza: Protest Movements and Inequality in Post-
Dictatorship Chile 
Shruti Jaishankar 
University of Mississippi. Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jaishankar, Shruti, "Chile Se Moviliza: Protest Movements and Inequality in Post-Dictatorship Chile" 
(2014). Honors Theses. 863. 
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis/863 
This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College (Sally McDonnell 
Barksdale Honors College) at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized 
administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu. 
CHILE SE MOVILIZA: PROTESTS AND INEQUALITY IN POST-
DICTATORSHIP CHILE  
 
 
© 2014  
Shruti Jaishankar 
 
 
A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion  
Of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies 
Croft Institute for International Studies 
Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College 
The University of Mississippi  
 
 
 
University of Mississippi  
May 2014  
 
 
 
Approved:  
_________________________________	  
Advisor: Dr. Susan Allen  
 
 
_________________________________	  
Reader: Dr. William Schenck 
 
 
_________________________________	  
Reader: Dr. Gregory Love 
 
 
	  	  
	  
ii	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2014 
Shruti Jaishankar 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
	  	  
	  
iii	  
 
ABSTRACT  
SHRUTI JAISHANKAR: CHILE SE MOVILIZA: PROTESTS AND INEQUALITY IN 
POST-DICTATORSHIP CHILE  
(Under the Direction of Dr. Susan Allen) 
 
On March 11, 1990, Augusto Pinochet, one of Latin America’s most infamous 
dictators, left office after Chileans ordered him to step down in a nationwide plebiscite. 
Since Pinochet harshly punished any and all dissenters, protests re-emerged in Chile as a 
popular form of political action. In this thesis, I examine the relationship between 
economic and political inequality and the frequency of protests and peaceful 
demonstrations in the country. I examine the theory behind why people protest, and later 
examine the history of individual protest movements (such as the Chilean Education 
Movement). Lastly, I run a regression to evaluate the relationship between GINI 
coefficient (a popular measure of income inequality) and the frequency of peaceful 
demonstrations since the end of the dictatorship. Though the regression does not indicate 
that there is a significant relationship between the two, survey data suggests that Chileans 
view protest as a legitimate and effective form of political action, and that they have little 
faith in the government and party system to represent their interests. Thus, I posit that 
Chileans protest because existing social and political infrastructures are not functioning 
as they should.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Latin America has suffered from debt crises, military dictatorships, natural 
disasters, and now a global recession. Countries such as Ecuador and Peru are among the 
hardest hit, but many reports argue that Chile has weathered its troubles fairly well. It has 
a stable GDP, a democratic government, and enjoys free trade with its neighbors. On the 
surface, Chile appears to be one of the more economically successful countries in the 
region, along with its neighbors Argentina and Uruguay.
Within the country, however, problems are abundant. Though Pinochet’s 
dictatorship fell over 20 years ago, Chilean citizens still remember and are still scarred 
from the violence and fear that pervaded the 17 years while he was in power. The 17 
years of trauma left a profound mark on Chileans, and they spent many years after the 
dictatorship undergoing a process of “political learning,” where they “modify their 
political beliefs and tactics as a result of severe crises, frustrations, and dramatic changes 
in environment” (Bermeo 274). The dictatorship instilled in Chile a “normative legacy 
that favored the creation of a democracy” because the elites and masses alike no longer 
wanted to live under the shadow of authoritarianism. However, though Chile has come a 
long way since its Pinochet days, it still suffers from many social and political problems. 
Vestigial memories of the dictatorship are far from the only problem Chile faces, 
however. Many Chileans believe that the country’s worst problem is its economic, social, 
and political inequality. Chile has a Gini Coefficient (a number between 0 and 1 that 
measures inequality, 0 being perfectly equal and 1 being perfectly unequal) that measures 
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over 0.5, showing that income inequality is considerable. In context, this statistic caused 
Business Insider magazine to rank Chile as one of its 39 most unequal countries in the 
world (Lincoln). Chile is more unequal than the United States and many nearby countries 
such as Peru, Argentina, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic. Chile ranked as the 16th 
most unequal country in the world in 2011, comparable to countries Papua New Guinea 
and Zambia (Lincoln).  
Chile’s inequality comes from a variety of factors. First, during the mid-twentieth 
century, Chile wavered between an economic model that favored state control of assets 
and a favorable balance of trade, to a privatized liberal model that relied on foreign 
investment. This inconsistency along with rapid liberalization was problematic, because 
though “liberalization programs do not in principle rule out redistributing assets for the 
sake of equalization… their spirit certainly goes against it” (Sheahan 9). This means that 
Chile’s sudden switch from state control and a social safety net to Liberal policies may 
have caused some of the inequality still present today. Throughout the 1980s and well 
into the 1990s, inequality increased in terms of consumption, income, and distribution of 
capital (Sheahan 15).  
Chile’s political system is problematic as well, as its constitution has been largely 
untouched since Pinochet rewrote it in 1982. Its electoral laws in particular were written 
to keep Pinochet’s opponents out of power, and thus some of the rules seem arbitrary and 
unfairly slanted in the modern age. Because Chileans have little faith in their political 
system, voter confidence is low. Instead, protests and demonstrations have become a 
popular vehicle to voice dissent in Chile.  
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With this thesis, I seek to understand the relationship between inequality and 
protests in Chile during the post-dictatorship period. I want to examine protests on a 
macro level. Instead of looking at individual rallies or marches, I will identify the root 
causes for protest movements to see what, if any, relationship they have with problems 
rooted in inequality such as repression and disparity of wealth. Though I do not believe 
that the pervasive inequality has caused all of the protests in Chile over its considerably 
tumultuous past, I do believe that since the end of the dictatorship, many of the protest 
movements in Chile have roots in the country’s struggles with inequality. Though it is 
impossible to predict with any certainty the frequency of all protests in any given year, I 
want to examine the relationship between inequality and protests in different areas of 
Chile to see if high inequality led to a higher rate of protests. 
 Chile is host to a variety of protest movements. The education protests are one 
such wave of protests, but they are far from the only ones. Protestors have been calling 
for greater minority rights and more competent government for years. Before I make any 
sort of conclusions about current-day protests in Chile, I explore the history and causes of 
protests since the dictatorship because individual protests movements are so varied. I will 
also include a section on theory to examine more generally why people protest. After 
contextualizing both the level and types of inequality in Chile and the recent history of 
protest, I will turn to a more quantitative form of analysis. 
In the quantitative section, I will examine data from the World Bank, and the UN 
Millennium Development Goal committee to examine the levels of inequality in the 
country. I will also use the World Bank and United Nations data to see how much 
progress Chile has made in overcoming some of its shortcomings in the education sector 
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since the beginning of the millennium. Lastly, I will run a regression to see if there is a 
relationship between access to education, and frequency of protests.  
Inequality is certainly not a unique problem; it is persistent in both developed and 
developing societies. Why then, does it lead to protests, riots, and domestic conflict in 
some nations like Chile, while in other nations it does not? The answer is far from simple 
and it is a combination of political, economic, and cultural factors. In this thesis, I will 
attempt to show that protest culture in Chile is symptomatic of the underlying inequality 
in the country.  
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 All inequality in Chile is not the same, nor does it manifest at the same rate in all 
sectors. Scholars throughout the world attempt to express “inequality” in a country with 
the use of one number, the GINI coefficient, but the GINI often only scratches the surface 
of the many divisions in any given country as it is only a statistic. Though disparity of 
wealth is a strong indicator of underlying political and economic problems in the country, 
it often does not go far enough in explaining social or cultural partitions that may prevent 
a country from progressing. 
In this section, I will look at three aspects of inequality. First, I look at inequality 
in purely economic terms and address Chile’s problems with income inequality and 
concentration of capital. Then, I look at Chile’s economic heritage to better understand 
the effect that neoliberal reforms had during the late 20th century. I will also attempt to 
gauge current Chilean feeling toward these reforms to better understand the economic 
concerns of modern day protestors.  
 Next, I will address political inequality. This is harder to quantify, but I can 
measure it through the World Values Survey and examination of Chile’s constitution and 
electoral laws. As a new democracy, Chile has overcome the hurdle of transitioning from 
an authoritarian government to a transparent and democratic one, but still has a long way 
to go in terms of institutions. I argue that the political infrastructure in the country 
perpetuates inequality and decreases overall faith in the system, and that this attitude 
leads to an increase in protest as Chilean citizens search for a better outlet to air their 
grievances. This section is particularly important because it helps link inequality and 
protest culture specifically in Chile.  
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 The last form of inequality I will discuss is social inequality and the effect it has 
on education. The latest wave of protests in Chile has organized around a common 
theme: great access to secondary education. This by no means is a new topic of protest, 
but instead demonstrates the idea that Chileans see their society as unfairly rigged to 
benefit the wealthy. In this section, I will discuss the way Chile’s education system is 
designed and why many Chileans dislike it. I hope to tie together Chile’s struggles with 
education, social mobility, and minority rights in this section.  
 
Economic Inequality  
The easiest and most visible marker of economic inequality in most countries is 
income inequality and wealth disparity. By looking at fluctuations in Chile’s GINI 
coefficient and by examining the concentration of land and wealth among Chilean 
citizens, we can glean an accurate picture of the economic health of the Chilean working 
class.  In the early 2000s, Chile’s GINI coefficient climbed as high as 0.57. The income 
of the richest 10% of Chilean citizens was greater than the total income of the bottom 
80% of Chilean households (Lopez and Miller 2679). The income inequality is a result of 
the failed economic policies of the Chilean government earlier in the century. The mixed 
success and eventual cessation of the Import Substitute Industrialization model and the 
rapid privatization of many industries during the Pinochet administration damaged the 
economy in the long run and marginalized many average Chilean citizens.  
The Import Substitution Industrialization economy policy was a way to declare 
economic independence from the countries of the global north. Though many Latin 
American countries were not directly involved in the two World Wars, they still suffered 
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as a result of the weak global market and worldwide inflation that it caused. In the period 
after the wars, many South American economies decided it was better to be self-sufficient 
and produce everything their citizens needed within the country.  Import substitution 
focused on domestic production of many goods, state subsidization of large industries, 
and protectionist trade policies. Chileans focused on mining copper and nitrate and 
refrained from importing any good they could produce themselves. As a result, in the 
period after the war, the level of exports in Asian countries grew on average about 10% a 
year, while exports fell in Latin American countries by 1% (Alcántara, Paramio, 
Freidenberg, and Déniz 12). This considerably hurt GDPs throughout the region, but the 
situation became dire as a result of “insufficient internal savings” and a high rate of 
protectionism (12). The oil shocks were the last straw; industrialization was already 
difficult to maintain in Latin America, but a “brutal elevation of energy costs” was too 
much. Countries all over the region experienced “a reduction of demand and as a result, a 
decrease in wages and economic stagnation” (10). Import substitution also kept the 
Chilean economy from diversifying, because the economy had flourished by extracting 
raw materials and developing them within the country. Its dependence on the extraction 
of resources is still hurting them today, because the Chilean economy’s fate is still 
partially tied to the fortune of one or two industries.  Chile remains “highly vulnerable to 
fluctuations in the world demand and price of [raw materials],” and is thus forced to 
maintain production at any cost. This cost usually falls heavily on the shoulders of the 
indigenous and working class population, who are paid a pittance for their work as costs 
of living are rising.  
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After Import Substitution, Chile saw the rapid adoption of neoliberal policies, 
overseen by the “Chicago boys,” Chilean economists trained at the University of 
Chicago. Chile’s authoritarian government felt that the only way to recover from the 
follies of the ISI model was to adopt capitalism as fast as possible and to integrate it into 
as many sectors as possible. Pinochet and the Chicago boys wished to open Chile to 
foreign trade, but participating in the international market system also meant opening 
each country to foreign investment, which initially was “concentrated in trade, shipping, 
railways, public utilities, and government loans” (Keen 202). Once the previously state-
controlled industries were opened to investment, foreign multi-national corporations 
quickly bought the profitable industries (such as copper and nitrate) and gradually took 
control of most of the profitable enterprises in the country. This economic control 
eventually led significant political influence, which only made inequality worse. The 
richest families in Chile almost completely controlled the financial sector, and foreign 
interests controlled most of the capital in the country. It was extremely difficult for the 
average citizen to engage in entrepreneurial activities and the working class had little 
opportunity for social mobility. The economic prospects of the working class have not 
improved much since the Pinochet dictatorship; “the successive democratic regimes… 
have been unable and/or unwilling to reduce inequality” and to level the playing field 
between Chile’s superrich and the working class (Lopez and Miller 2769).   
Chileans have protested their economic situations for years now, but due to the 
repressive and violent nature of the Pinochet regime, it was difficult to claim that the sole 
reason people were protesting during the 80s was due to economic inequality. More 
likely, economic inequality was an underlying cause for discontent, but it is more likely 
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that Chileans took to the streets to express their disapproval of the Pinochet regime’s 
treatment of dissidents. However, since the fall of the regime and over the past ten or so 
years, it is easier to make the argument that Chileans are protesting the apparent 
inequality in their society. For example, a journalist interviewed one young protestor in 
Santiago in 2006 and asked him why he was vandalizing private property. His response 
was, “aquí hay dos Chiles, y yo odio al otro” or “here there are two Chiles, and I hate the 
other.”  The young man was expressing that he believes that there are “two Chiles,” the 
Chile of the richest 10%, and the relatively working-class remainder. The rich live 
comfortably in a manner that rivals the rich of any developed country, but the working 
class suffers and openly resents the rich, a sentiment the youth clearly expressed when he 
claimed “yo odio al otro,” or “I hate the other [Chile]” (Lopez and Miller 2769).  
 
Political Inequality 
Economic inequality is a far-reaching and obvious cause of dissent in Chile, but it 
is not any more important than the political problems that still plague the country. Before 
the Pinochet regime, Chile suffered from instability and extreme factionalism while 
Salvador Allende was president. After Allende was ousted in a violent, US-funded coup, 
Pinochet took power and rewrote the country’s constitution in 1982. The constitution of 
1982 was designed to perpetuate and strengthen Pinochet’s power while eliminating 
opportunities for his opposition. The new constitution decreed, “that nine non-elected 
senators, four of them former military and police commanders, would sit alongside 26 
(now 38) elected ones; it gave General Pinochet a Senate seat for life; and it deprived 
elected presidents of their right to dismiss military commanders-in-chief or the chief of 
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police” (Untying the Knot – The Economist). Reforms since have done away with the 
“senators for life,” but some of the more perplexing aspects of the constitution, such as 
the binomial electoral system, still endure.  
The binomial system has been a consistent source of strife since its introduction in 
1982. While the system seems like a small facet of the larger political system, electoral 
laws can profoundly affect party dynamics and influence the way voters feel about the 
political system. For example, the design of an electoral system can push a party system 
into favoring many small parties or do the opposite and encourage two or three large 
parties. A flawed electoral system can also make voters feel as if their vote does not 
matter, and lead to a decrease in political participation, or make voters feel as if they do 
not have a direct role in the decision making process of a given country. Since “the 
relevance of a party system lies… in how it reflects and in turn helps to mitigate or 
aggravate [the] tension” between the accumulation of capital and the distribution of 
wealth, a flawed electoral system can in turn make voters feel like they are not receiving 
enough benefits from their government (Barrett 2). This is exactly the case in Chile, 
where “each constituency elects two members to each house. To get both seats, a party or 
coalition must get double the vote of the runner-up. The centre-left coalition in power 
since 1990 has never won enough seats to change the constitution” (Untying the Knot).  
In short, a party only wins both seats if they receive double the vote of the opposition 
party. Chile’s binomial system leads to disproportionate representation throughout the 
country.  
Due to this imbalance, parties have been forced to band together for support and 
success and many Chileans have little to no faith in the political process at all.  In the 
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fifth round of the World Values Survey, one thousand respondents in Chile were polled 
in 2006 and asked how much confidence they had in their political parties. The majority 
of Chilean surveyed said that they either have “not very much” confidence in political 
parties or “none at all.” Only about 20% of respondents had “quite a lot” or “a great deal” 
of confidence in political parties (World Values Survey, Fourth Wave). In the most recent 
round of the survey, faith in parties stayed mostly the same. Of roughly a thousand 
respondents surveyed, the vast majority stated they had “not very much” faith in political 
parties, and many claimed that they had no faith at all (World Values Survey, Sixth 
Wave). Respondents had a similar attitude about the government: in 2006 (the fourth 
wave of the study), the second largest percentage of respondents had “not very much” 
faith in the Chilean government. By the sixth wave of the survey, taken between 2010 
and 2014, the percentage stayed almost exactly the same. The data shows that not only do 
Chileans not have faith in their political parties to fulfill their basic functions, but they do 
not trust the parties after they have been elected into government either.  
This lack of faith in political parties is alarming and significant when we evaluate 
the frequency of protests in the country. Political parties are important because they are 
the most efficient way to link the government with the citizens of a country. Richard Katz 
defines political parties as “an autonomous group of citizens having the purpose of 
making nominations and contesting elections in the hope of gaining control over 
governmental power through the capture of public offices and the organization of the 
government” (Katz 2006, 220). If the citizens of a country do not have faith in the 
country’s party system, they are less likely to try and engage in it and are more likely to 
seek other avenues to make their voices heard. According to Hans Daalder, a party 
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system, or more than one party, is necessary because it establishes a “legitimate 
opposition” while also facilitating “the process of inclusion of more and more groups in 
the political system” (Daalder 2001, 41). In Chile’s case, the citizens don’t trust the 
parties to serve as “legitimate opposition” to each other or the government, so they must 
oppose the government in other ways such as protests.  
 
Social Inequality: Education and current day protests 
While political inequality and economic issues are obvious sources of domestic 
conflict in Chile, social inequality is also an important root of the problem. The Chilean 
struggle for equal access to education, minority rights, and other basic social welfares 
existed during the Pinochet regime but endured into the newly democratized country. 
Because Pinochet enacted many Liberal reforms that chipped away the country’s social 
safety net, many Chileans wished for a return to more socialist policies. This push 
gradually gained momentum through the 90s and into the 2000s, and has found its most 
recent incarnation in the Chilean Education Movement.  
The push for equal access to quality education was a recurring theme in Chile 
after Pinochet did away with free secondary education, but the movement began to pick 
up steam again in 2011.  At that time, a group of Chilean students banded together to 
continue to protest the high tuition costs and lack of access to higher education in Chile. 
Before the Pinochet era, public education was free, or at the very least, state-subsidized. 
When Pinochet rose to power, the education sector was partially privatized along with 
several other industries. Though many countries throughout the world, the United States 
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included, still have privatized education systems, many Chileans resent the rising cost of 
secondary education because it was free at one point in Chilean history.  
Nevertheless, Chile currently enjoys greater access to primary education than the 
vast majority of countries in the world. Statistics The World Bank reports that over 100% 
of children enjoy access to primary schooling. This inflated statistic includes children that 
have been held back or are traditionally too old to attend primary school. Despite the flaw 
in the statistic, this number still shows that the vast majority of Chilean children have 
access to and attend primary school. Over the past 10 years, Chile has provided the same 
level of access to primary school as most high-income OECD countries though it is 
considered a mid-income OECD country itself. In some years, Chile has outperformed 
many other OECD countries in providing primary education to children (World Bank 
Database). On a global standpoint, Chile appears to be doing very well in its education 
sector, but Chilean citizens remain unsatisfied because education becomes more difficult 
to attain the further a student progresses in school. 
Objectively, Chile doesn’t suffer from the same level of educational deprivation 
as many developing countries, but the country does have real problems with educational 
stratification. Many scholars argue that there is “persistent inequality” in Chile arising 
from the market reforms of the Pinochet area (Torche 316). Access to education remains 
more or less equal during primary school, but “there is a small but significant increase in 
inequality in the transition to secondary education” (Torche 316). This means that despite 
the fact that education franchises as a whole have expanded in Chile and countries like 
Chile (meaning that more universities and trade schools are available), “educational 
attainment has remained constant over the decades” (Torche 316). The prevailing factor 
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that influences educational attainment is still social background, meaning that lower-
income students or first-generation college students are still those that are least likely to 
matriculate.  
Lack of access to secondary education continues to make the social mobility 
necessary for equality difficult. Inequality, defined as “the distribution of resources at any 
point in time” is high in Chile as previously discussed because the country’s resources are 
in the hands of a few (Torche 424). Social mobility, defined in this context as upward 
movement through the social strata, is a tenet of most capitalist societies. However, 
mobility is difficult in societies where education is one of the only vehicles available for 
upward mobility (i. e., a transition from the working to the middle class). Education 
“increases the chances that someone with a particular social origin will attain a more 
rather than less advantageous [social] destination” and helps people overcome burdens 
placed on them due to their economic backgrounds and thus helps them break the cycle 
of poverty (Torche 425). High inequality causes “greater distance in terms of human, 
financial, cultural, and social resources across different origins” (425), but education 
helps level that distance by giving lower class citizens the opportunity to participate in 
the national discourse. However, much of the inequality in Chile is concentrated in the 
education sector, mobility is not impossible, but difficult for Chilean citizens. The lack of 
mobility and lack of access to education go hand in hand to make life difficult for the 
Chilean working class. Inequality becomes most problematic when avenues to overcome 
it (like education and a flourishing job market) are readily available. However, in Chile’s 
case, education is difficult to attain and so the lower class cannot always rise above their 
situation.  
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Because Chile has made the transition from an agrarian country to one that has a 
more diversified economy, its problems can no longer be fixed by land or market reform. 
When inequality was high in Chile during the 1960s and 1970s, the government instituted 
comprehensive land reform, where traditional haciendas were broken into smaller plots of 
land for individual proprietors. This reform decreased the “extreme land concentration” 
in the country, taking the land out of the hands of a few wealthy landowners and placing 
it back into the hands of individual Chileans. This did wonders for Chilean inequality in 
the short term, when Chile still relied heavily upon the land as a source of income. 
Market reform in the 80s again reduced inequality by increasing the number of business 
owners in the country thus allowing them a larger share of the capital available in the 
country. This still was not a complete success, however, since many Chilean business 
owners engage in “survival activities” and not the active accumulation of capital. Thus, 
the vast majority of capital in the country is still concentrated in the hands of the few, and 
no further market reforms can reduce this disparity (Torche 431). The answer, then, may 
lie in mobility through education. Experts have identified that the reallocation of 
resources isn’t the answer, but the creation of a larger volume of more specialized jobs 
may revitalize the country. However, this is only possible if every Chilean has an equal 
chance at a solid education.  
Since 2011, the movement for free education has expanded at an exponential rate. 
Marches and protests are organized approximately once a week, and often the students 
engage in “paros” or “tomas,” which are extreme forms of protest that range from a 
refusal to attend class to the seizure of university buildings. In my own experience, my 
university, the Pontifical Catholic University of Valparaiso, was in paro by my second 
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month there. Students refused to attend classes, choosing instead to keep up with their 
schoolwork on their own time and to protest high tuition costs. Within another month, 
many students had voted to progress to a toma, in which they lock down a university 
building and live in it for months at a time, refusing admittance to any university 
officials. Though my school did not participate in a toma that extreme, many of the 
buildings remained locked for days and I had to show my passport to the guards stationed 
at the doors to prove that I wasn’t on the University staff and was required to continue 
attending classes. The New York Times described the Education Movement in its early 
days as a “Chilean Winter” – students engaged in hunger strikes, mass mobilizations, and 
were even subject to tear gas and water cannons (Barrionuevo) 
The protest movement emerged from a feeling of marginalization, both within the 
university and in the education system as a whole.  The students recognize that change is 
only possible with “the conscious effort of specific interest groups to adapt the 
University,” but these conscious efforts often fall flat (Torres and Schugurensky 434). 
One leaders of the education movement explained that he and his fellow protestors “no 
ve[mos] un canal politico” because “la constitución y el sistema binomial lo prohiben,” or 
“we don’t see a political channel because the constitution and the binomial system 
prohibit it.”  This means that Giorgio Jackson, the aforementioned student leader, doesn’t 
see a political channel that the protestors can use to demand change because the 
constitution and the binomial system prohibit it (Chile se Moviliza).  
This inability to utilize the political system clearly shows that the political and 
economic inequality is beginning to divide society. The students see themselves as a 
completely different sector of society than those in power, and even consider themselves 
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marginalized to the extent that the system will not work for them. The students consider 
themselves marginalized even from the press; one student interviewed by al-Jazeera 
boldly claims “in Chile the media lies” (Fault Lines: Chile Rising). The same student 
expresses his concern over the unfair coverage when he states, “they are hitting my 
friends… the news doesn’t show it” (Fault Lines: Chile Rising). Chilean student 
protestors have attracted a large following in the two years they have been protesting, but 
the growth in the movement is largely due to word-of-mouth and foreign press.  
The Chilean education protests are symptomatic of larger problems in Chilean 
society. The political and economic inequity affects all sectors of Chilean society, not just 
industry and governance. Chilean citizens do not feel as if they live in a society that 
affords them social mobility and instead feel as if there are “two Chiles” – one of the rich, 
and one for the rest. Instead of these two groups coming to a compromise, the divide 
between the groups is widening and “the perceived futility of any attempt to negotiate has 
spread feelings of disillusion” throughout the movement and the country (Guzman-
Concha 410).  
Protest culture in Chile has been alive and strong for decades now and is certainly 
not a recent phenomenon. However, the protests within the past two decades seem to be 
motivated by a different theme than those before and during the Pinochet administration. 
Under the dictatorship, protests were directly related to the repression and violence of the 
regime. Now that the regime has fallen, protests seem to reflect instead the underlying 
problems in Chilean society, most of which have roots in the political and economic 
inequality that arose from an inconsistent political system and many ill-advised reforms. 
Inequality has created a society in Chile that is sharply divided by class, but the existing 
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political infrastructure does not give average Chileans an efficient means by which to 
level the playing field.  
  
CHAPTER 2: THEORY – WHY DO PEOPLE PROTEST? 
 
Inequality is a problem in post-dictatorship Chile, but it certainly is not a unique 
problem. Inequality plagues even the most powerful of nations, the United States 
included. The GINI Coefficient in the United States wavers between 0.45 to over .5, a 
level that is similar to the Chilean one. Why then, do Chilean students take to the streets 
on an almost weekly basis while American ones do not? Why is it that the Chilean 
protests span generations, and are frequent and furious, while the American Occupy Wall 
Street movement fizzled as quickly as it started? It is impossible to find one reason why 
Chileans are more likely to protest than Americans. It could be because Americans have 
abundant access to a variety of media channels. It could be because Chileans don’t trust 
the government or the governmental process after 17 years of a dictatorship. There are 
many underlying themes that cause protests in Chile, but they all have collective identity, 
common grievances, and relative deprivation at their root. 
It may seem intuitive, but individual protests and more importantly, large-scale 
protest movements do not form unless the protestors are unified around a similar identity. 
This is why certain groups or sectors of society tend to protest together; “activists share 
definition of their situation” and thus are able to use those commonalities to organize. 
Protests gain traction when “shared affinity motivate[s] participation” and individual 
protestors buy into the larger collective identity. In this context, collective identity is 
defined as “an individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional connection to a broader 
community” (Polletta and Jasper 285). This definition has twofold significance for this 
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thesis. First, it implies that a broader community with shared ideals must first exist as the 
foundation for any movement. Second, it also implies that an individual must actively 
identify or connect with this community. An individual protestor or participant must 
identify that they possess the common trait and link it to a larger community.  
In Chile, it is easy to identify the collective identity or collective consciousness 
that many protestors choose to align with. There are various protest movements spanning 
the country, many of which have endured since the time of the dictatorship. Therefore, 
because there are well-organized protest movements, it is easy to see the collective 
identity those protestors rally behind. These identities may have emerged as a result of 
the movement or as the unifying factor behind it. Activists in the indigenous push for 
equal rights were able to identify with their indigenous heritage, and protestors in the 
student movement are able to unify around their shared student status. Collective 
identities are large, but not all encompassing. A collective identity exists by nature to 
contrast with another identity, which makes relative deprivation easier to identify and 
thus makes it easier for protests to form.  
Protestors by themselves only form a small part of a larger collective identity; 
they are the “the tip of larger masses who feel that their interests and/or values are 
violated” (qtd in van Stekelenburg 225). Therefore, collective identities are necessary for 
protests to form, but the existence of a collective identity is not enough to lead to a 
protest. Simply put, “protestors are aggrieved, but not all aggrieved people protest” (225). 
Some other factor, then, must push people past identifying with a larger community to 
openly advocating on behalf for that community in the form of protest. Identifying 
common grievances within the community is the next step, but emotional investment in 
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those grievances is also important. The grievances create an environment in which “men 
are exposed to noxious stimuli that they cannot avoid or overcome,” that leads to 
frustration and a tendency to “strike out at their sources” (Jost, Chaikalis-Petritsis, 
Abrams, Sidanius, van der Toorn, and Bratt 198). Experts agree that unifying around an 
identity is the first step, but that identity must be suffering from sort of trial. Further, the 
existence of the identity or the trial is a necessary condition for a protest, but not a 
sufficient one. Referring back to the problem of the economic inequality and income 
disparity, this inequality by itself does not cause protests.  North America is a salient 
example; its citizens, by virtue of living in a capitalist society “are more likely to tolerate 
extreme forms of economic inequality” (Jost et al 197). The wealth gap in the United 
States is considerable, but by itself was not enough to cause widescale protests on the 
same scale as Chile. Perception is key. Since protestors “respond to the world as they 
perceive and interpret it,” they become active only when the common grievance is 
perceived as too grave to “avoid or overcome” (van Stekelenburg 224). 
Common identity and the identification of a common grievance both work hand in 
hand to create a societal group that is relatively deprived. Relative deprivation occurs 
when a group in society beings to compare themselves to another group in society rather 
than to society as a whole. Relative deprivation occurs among groups “when objective 
quality standards are unavailable,” and therefore,  “satisfaction depends on how well 
reality meets a person’s expectations” (Schmitt, Wideman, and Maes 123). In other 
words, protestors compare themselves to another, more privileged social group, and then 
decide if they are “deprived” in comparison to that group.  
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Chile suffers from what is known as fraternal relative deprivation, rather than 
egoistic relative deprivation. Egoistic relative deprivation, as the name implies, occurs 
when individuals feel unfairly treated and they contextualize their unfair treatment by 
comparing themselves to other individuals. The protest movements that I am discussing 
are illustrations of fraternal relative deprivation, where “members of a social category… 
believe their group as a whole is denied a deserved outcome” (Schmitt et al 123). The 
formation of collective identity among the indigenous tribes and among Chilean students 
show that relative deprivation in the country is not being experienced solely on an 
individual level, but is pervading entire sectors of society. Many scholars theorize that 
egoistic relative deprivation is not enough to cause protest, but that the formation of a 
collective conscious and the identification of common grievances leads to a feeling of 
fraternal deprivation, and fraternal deprivation causes protests (Schmitt et al 123).  
In the case of the education protests, many students are comparing themselves to 
super-wealthy Chileans in order to determine that they are in fact deprived. These 
students can see that the wealthy enjoy greater benefits than they do, as well as greater 
access to factors that could aid in social mobility, like education. Students, such as the 
one previously cited who believed there were “two Chiles,” identify themselves as 
relatively deprived because they can see that the “other” Chile is better off than the one in 
which they live (Lopez and Miller 2769). 
In Chile, groups of protestors see themselves as relatively deprived, but they 
define this deprivation in terms of both income and opportunities. Protestors often see 
that they are relatively deprived of access to education or even access to higher-wage 
jobs. As a result, protests are not limited just to the urban working poor and the education 
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protests are no exception. Protests may begin among the urban working class, but 
“usually, these low-income groups combine with other groups” such as “middle-class 
consumers and business organizations” (Walton and Ragin 877). The widespread appeal 
of protest movements in Chile show that the issues people are protesting may not be 
static or even easily identifiable, but people protest because they feel they are being 
marginalized in favor of a small (elite) sector of society.  
Income is the most obvious and most empirical way to measure relative 
deprivation. Shlomo Yitzhaki was among the first pioneers to quantify relative 
deprivation by arguing that there is an inverse relationship between a country’s Gini 
coefficient and the level of relative deprivation felt by its citizens. Yitzhaki and 
subsequent economists studying relative deprivation felt that income was an important 
way to contextualize relative deprivation because it is an “index of the individual’s ability 
to consume commodities” (Yitzhaki 321). Therefore, instead of seeing relative 
deprivation as a nebulous concept experienced only by large groups of people, Yitzhaki’s 
model allows us to understand why individuals seek community identities to form 
behind; it is because their common grievances are often rooted in concrete, monetary 
concerns. Therefore, Yitzhaki chooses to measure a person’s index of relative deprivation 
by calculating “the range of income for which he is deprived” against “the range of 
income for which he is satisfied,” resulting in “the sum of the deprivation inherent in all 
units of income he is deprived of” (322). Aggregating these individual indices of relative 
deprivation allows us to arrive at a figure for an entire society, or in this case, country 
like Chile. Yitzhaki also argues that the Gini coefficient, because it aggregates the 
economic inequality in a country, is a “quantification of the well-known theory of relative 
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deprivation” (324). Thus, looking at Chile’s GINI coefficient allows us to make some 
educated conjectures about relative deprivation in the country.  
As previously discussed, Chile’s GINI coefficient has wavered at around 0.5 over 
the past three years (World Bank Databse: GINI Index). This makes it not the most 
unequal country in South America (Columbia and Panama have similar or higher 
figures), but it is certainly high on the list. Therefore, we can postulate that since the 
GINI Coefficient is comparably high in Chile and objectively high for a developed 
country, the level of relative deprivation within the country must also be high. Because he 
GINI coefficient measures inequality on a macro scale, aggregate deprivation must be the 
type of relative deprivation that is high. In this case and the case of many other countries 
(such as India before the caste system was outlawed and agrarian China) deprivation 
grows into wider discontent. Relatively deprived citizens “[are] motivated to either 
change their membership,” meaning they are motivated to leave the country or at least 
leave the society, “change the dimensions of comparison, or he/she may be directed 
towards revolution for changing the existing social system” (Saha 36). In Chile, we can 
see a clear tendency towards a desire to “change the existing social system.”  
This marginalization as a result of relative deprivation has more than just an 
economic impact; it manifests in the country’s electoral laws and politics as well. The 
inequality in the electoral system reflects the relative deprivation particularly well.  
Because it places unfair barriers in front of the opposition party more so than the 
incumbent party, it relatively deprives its supporters. Former Chilean president Ricardo 
Lagos’s first ministerial race illustrates this problem well. In 1989, Lagos ran for office in 
a relatively wealthy part of the country – the Santiago West district. Pinochet had been 
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removed from power, and Lagos had made a name for himself as a vocal Pinochet 
opponent. Running as a candidate for the newly instated Socialist party, Lagos seemed 
like the obvious choice for the seat. However, even though Lagos won a large majority of 
the vote, he lost the election because he had failed to procure double the votes of the 
candidate with the second-most votes and the seat went to his opponent. The binomial 
system was originally designed to protest the right, but endured into post-dictatorship 
Chile and now favors incumbents. Ultimately, the election would not damage Lagos’s 
career as he would eventually become the Minister of Finance and later the President, but 
his failed senate bid is still infamous in Chilean history because it showed that the system 
is not just unequal, it blatantly favors the incumbent group. Along with the “changes that 
accompany democratic consolidation,” Chilean political parties, particularly on the Left, 
had to make strategic choices to capture as many voters as possible since appealing only 
to the working class and poor was not enough to get them elected. The Concertación 
struggled to both “express the demands of the poor” and “implement neoliberal economic 
policies and make overtures to the business sector,” two seemingly contradictory political 
agendas (Angell and Pollack 358).  
This trend does not merely cause schizophrenic politics; because the party system 
is so fragmented, most Chilean people see that politics is a game for the wealthy and 
established, and that they are actively being deprived of their voice. By 1997, a mere 7 
years after General Pinochet stepped down, “there was evidence that indifference and 
hostility to the political system was increasing” (359). A growing number of Chileans 
either refrained from voting, turned in blank ballots, or annulled their votes. The number 
of voters stayed relatively high for a number of reasons; “a well-entrenched party system 
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is still able to mobilise [sic] the support of substantial sectors of the electorate” and 
because after a long history of authoritarianism, voters would vote to “as an affirmation 
of support for democracy” (360). Chileans were voting, but without faith that the system 
would do anything to help them. Thus, disillusionment grew outward from the lower 
classes and began to seep into the middle classes. It is no surprise that in Chile, a country 
with “a strong tradition of urban community organization,” citizens of all socioeconomic 
levels saw taking to the streets in protest an effective way to incentivize change (Walton 
and Ragin 886).  
Protests are a fairly common way to express dissent throughout the world. They 
are currently being used everywhere from Venzuela to Egypt to the Ukraine. Most 
protests, though geographically disparate, occur for the same reasons. They occur when a 
group of people unite behind a singular identity and then identify a common grievance. 
This marginalization proceeds from passive discontent to open protest when the members 
of the deprived community identify their grievance as too grave to continue to live under. 
Relative deprivation sets the state for protest, both on an individual level and a 
community level, but the tipping point is when a group feels disenfranchised in a such a 
way that conventional methods will not suffice to improve their situation. In Chile 
specifically, protests have emerged because of an individual feeling of economic 
deprivation and a fraternal feeling of disenfranchisement from politics and resources.  
 
 
CHAPTER 3: A BRIEF HISTORY OF PROTESTS IN CHILE 
 
 Many of the protests currently occurring in Chile enjoy success in part because 
the protestors are standing on the shoulders of protest giants. Protests have long been a 
popular and legitimate way for citizens to air grievances in Chile and Latin America. 
Protest are popular because they allow people to force their governments to be more 
accountable in fear of the people “ris[ing] up and throw[ing] them out of office if 
dissatisfied” (Meirowitz and Tucker 478).  Even under the Pinochet administration, when 
protesters were frequently punished with imprisonment, public beatings, and in some 
cases death, Chileans still united in the streets. Protests have always been the most potent 
tool in the activist’s arsenal because it allows them to use their “people power” to 
organize and call attention to their cause (Meirowitz and Tucker 479). In the Middle East, 
thousands of young people gathered in capital cities throughout the region to protest their 
tyrannical governments and eventually succeeded in removing dictators from power 
(Meirowitz and Tucker 478). In Argentina, the Madres del Plaza de Mayo gathered 
silently in Buenos Aires every Thursdays to call attention to the atrocities the 
Argentinean junta had committed. Eventually the Madres became so influential that 
modern political candidates sought their endorsements while running for office. The 
Madres still march today as a living reminder of the atrocities committed in the country 
so that they may never be repeated
For the purposes of this paper, I will be focusing on protest movements that 
occurred after Pinochet fell from power. The reasons for this are numerous: first, it is 
nearly impossible to find complete data on the frequency of protests because Pinochet did 
not want it known. Second, because I am interested in how protests complement and 
struggle against the political process in Chile, it would be inappropriate to analyze protest 
data from before the country became a modern democracy.  
Since Pinochet, there have been various protest movements throughout Chile, but 
for the purposes of examining the effect of political and social inequality on protests, I 
plan on focusing on two broad themes. First, I want to examine the push for minority and 
indigenous rights because it clearly fits within the theme of relative deprivation. The 
struggle for minority rights within majority-ruled societies is the cause of conflict in 
many parts of the world, and in Chile, like many other Latin American countries, the 
struggle has turned bloody. The second sector of protests I want to examine will be the 
push for education reform over the past 20 years. The recent wave of these protests has 
sought to win free secondary education for Chileans, but the push for a more 
opportunities through education has been an underlying theme for many years. I believe 
examining these two themes will encapsulate much of the conflict in the country and 
allow me to make educated generalizations about the root of protests in modern-day 
Chile.  
 
Minority Rights 
The Mapuche, Chile’s indigenous population, comprise about 8% of Chile’s total 
population and have suffered many of the same indignities that as Native American 
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population in the United States. Historically, the Mapuche have lived in the Auracania 
region of Chile and had deep ties to the land, but the growth in Chilean mining and 
energy industries has threatened their way of life. In 1993, the new Concertación 
government passed the Indigenous People Act, guaranteeing that the Mapuche would 
have political representation and that the government would respect their rights to own 
property, but the final version of the act was toothless and didn’t afford the Mapuche the 
protection under the law the deserved. Furthermore, construction companies, lumber 
companies, and urban expansion pushed many Mapuche off their land. As of 2011, the 
Mapuche own only 300,000 hectares of land (Spain and Gatehouse). This 
disenfranchisement coupled with underrepresentation has encouraged the Mapuche to 
demonstrate against the government.  
The Mapuche protests crescendoed during Michele Bachelet’s first term as 
president, during the early 2000s. Though Bachelet was and is extremely popular among 
Chileans, her relations with the indigenous population of the country are rocky at best. 
Bachelet jailed more Mapuche dissidents than any of her predecessors, and her 
administration was accused of using an anti-terrorism law to discriminate against 
Mapuche protestors. During the 1980s, Pinochet was accused of using this same law to 
quell Mapuche dissent, and Bachelet’s administration came under international scrutiny 
for their treatment of the Mapuche. Unsurprisingly, the Mapuche rebelled at the abuse the 
government and big businesses leveled against them and protested, often violently (Spain 
and Gatehouse).  
Since Bachelet left power, the relationship between the government and the 
Mapuche has not gotten much better. As recently as Columbus Day of this year, Mapuche 
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protestors gathered in Santiago and clashed violently with the police. An estimated 
15,000 Mapuche participated in the march to, many of them affirming that Columbus 
Day brought them “nothing to celebrate” (Chile Indigenous Groups Mark Columbus Day 
With Protests). This protest shows that even after decades of protest and conflict with the 
government, their situation has not improved. The Mapuche feel that they are “frequently 
marginalized by those who set the terms of the discussion” in national politics and in 
academic settings (Richards 201).  Because they feel this marginalization, the Mapuche 
in this case can be considered both relatively and objectively deprived.  When they 
protest and call attention to the difference between how the government treats them 
compared to the other 92% of the Chilean population, they show the world that they do 
not enjoy the same status in Chilean society. This deprivation caused by the underlying 
inequality in Chilean society keeps the Mapuche from utilizing political or judicial 
channels to better there situation and forces them into a violent conflict with those in 
power.  
 
Equal Opportunities in Education 
The Education Movement, as previously discussed, has many of the same aims as 
the Mapuche struggle for independence because it is also a fight for equal opportunities 
and resources, though its campaign casts a wide net to encompass all Chilean students. 
Students in Chile have been protesting almost as long as the Mapuche – in 1960, one 
scholar outlined the chronic unhappiness of the Chilean student going back 50 years. In 
1960, Frank Bonilla argued that many of the problems Chilean universities were facing 
were due to “chronic poverty; less a result of the indifference of the government than of 
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the perennial economic difficulties in Chile” (Bonilla 312). Today, Chile can hardly make 
the same argument as it has seen decades of positive economic growth, yet students are 
still unhappy with the University system. The Education Movement is significant not 
because it is novel, but instead because “it is the result of the combination of long-term 
historical factors with causes that relate to the political process, and the presence of 
triggers” (Guzman-Concha 409).  
No “single variable” can account for the root of the education movement 
(Guzman-Concha 409). As early as 1960, there was a push for “free” education from the 
Catholic church and other socially conservative groups, but by “free” they meant 
“sectarian and free from government supervision,” the opposite of the current goals of the 
Chilean Education Movement, which campaigns for government subsidized secondary 
education (Bonilla 313). Even though the specific goals of the students have changed due 
to the country’s different political climate, student unrest is not a new phenomenon in 
Chile because the underlying problems have not changed much.   
The current Chilean education movement thus piggybacks on decades of protests 
organized around the same theme. At this point, whether or not they achieve their 
concrete goal of attaining free secondary education for all Chileans falls secondary to 
their goal of building awareness of the underlying inequalities that persist in Chile. The 
students “called for new institutional arrangements to improve the democratic system” as 
much as they called for the concrete reforms that form their platform. That the protestors 
have called global attention to their plight and have been publicly acknowledged by the 
ruling elite in their country is in itself a significant feat.  
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During my stay in Chile, I was fortunate enough to see Aleida Guevara, daughter 
of revolutionary Che Guevara, speak at the University of Valparaiso. During her talk, she 
addressed the student protestors present that day, urging them to continue their fight, 
expressing her approval of their message, and even going so far as to declare that her 
father would have been proud of them. I could see the effect that her words had on many 
of the students present. They were visibly energized; the applause and cheering after she 
expressed her support lasted for minutes. For months I had wondered why the Chilean 
Education Movement enjoyed the success that it did; its mission seemed futile and it was 
extremely disorganized. At that moment I understood: they were protesting not for an 
immediate overhaul of the system, but as an extended campaign to raise awareness of 
their plight. In the long run, Chile may never enjoy free secondary education, but in the 
short term, “the students’ movement ask[s] why certain matters could not be deliberated 
and decided beyond the boundaries of those groups with access to political institutions,” 
thus addressing inequality, the root of most problems in Chilean society. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODOLOGY   
 In this section, I will be culling data from a variety of sources to evaluate two 
things.  First, I will be looking at access to education across the country. By looking at 
primary school completion rates and university enrollment throughout the country, I will 
be able to contextualize the Chilean disappointment with their education system. 
Throughout this section, I will periodically compare Chilean data with data from 
Argentina and Uruguay, Chile’s neighbors that have followed a similar path of 
development. During the 20th century, all three countries experienced a transition from 
democracy to dictatorship and then an eventual return to democracy. Specifically over the 
past 50 years, all three countries threw off a dictatorial yoke and slowly transitioned into 
modern democracies and post-industrial economies. Economically, these countries also 
have similar roots. All three have experimented with bouts of socialism and then quickly 
returned to a neo-liberal model. Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay all underwent this process 
at slightly different times and manners, but the end result produced countries with similar 
political and economic structures.
By looking at access to education both within Chile and in comparison to its 
neighbors Argentina and Uruguay, I can measure the level of objective deprivation in the 
country. If Chileans are objectively worse off than their neighbors, or if they suffer from 
low primary school completion or university enrollment, I can attribute part of the cause 
for the recent wave of protests to that phenomenon. However, if Chile appears to have a 
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robust education system compared to its neighbors and is performing at the level an 
OECD country is expected to perform, the root cause of protests may be a more general 
phenomenon such as relative deprivation.  
Finally, I plan on running a regression to calculate the relationship between the 
frequency of protests and inequality. I will use the frequency of protests in a given year 
as my dependent variable, and the country’s GINI coefficient for my independent 
variable. Starting in 1994, I will see how, if at all, the country’s GINI coefficient has 
changed over the past 15 or 20 years. Then, I will look at the number of protests or anti-
government demonstrations over the same period. I will run  a regression to see if the 
GINI coefficient is at all correlated with the number of protests in a year. I hypothesize 
that if the level of relative deprivation in a country is low, the frequency of protests in a 
given year will also be low. This hypothesis will tell me whether or not Chileans protest 
due to objective deprivation (the clear absence of resources) or relative deprivation 
caused by the factors I discussed earlier.  
 
Access to Education  
 Because of Chile’s robust GDP, it is considered a middle-income OECD country. 
Among such countries with similar incomes, indicators such primary school completion 
and tertiary school enrollment can be used to gauge the overall health and potential for 
growth in a country. Specifically in the context of this paper, I want to look at primary 
school completion rates to see how they compare to secondary and tertiary school 
completion rates within Chile.  I will look at how these rates compare over time to see if 
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Chile has an objective problem with education. I will also briefly examine survey data to 
see how Chileans feel about the overall state of their education system. 
 
 
 
Graph 1  
  
Time 
Source: World Bank Database 
 
This chart shows the gross enrollment rate of primary students in Chile from 
2004-2011. Percentages over 100% show children that have been held back or dropped 
out to return to finish their schooling.  Thus, Chile seems to enjoy full primary school 
enrollment, and most, if not all appropriately aged children are enrolled in some type of 
primary schooling program. Though Chile seems to suffer from an excess of over and 
under aged students, students seem to at least have access to a primary school education. 
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Graph 2 – Secondary School Enrollment in Chile  
  
 
Source: World Bank Database 
 
 The second chart shows the rate of secondary school enrollment in both Chile 
from 2004 to 2011, showing that between 10-15% of the secondary school aged 
population is not enrolled in school. This is a significant drop from the previous chart, 
which showed that most children were enrolled in primary school. Though Chile 
struggles to keep children in school between the primary and secondary stage, students 
seem to at least have access to the education if they want it. The problem then does not 
manifest in the early stages of education. Protestors are aggrieved because of the quality 
of and access to secondary and tertiary schools.  
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Graph 3 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Database 
Graph 3 is the most important chart thus far because it is the only one to address 
enrollment in universities, or tertiary schools. Since the bulk of this paper has discussed 
the opportunities (or lack thereof) for Chilean students to pursue undergraduate degrees, 
this data is particularly enlightening. This chart shows the percentage of tertiary school 
enrollment in Chile.  
What is interesting about this chart is that Chile has seen tertiary school 
enrollment greatly increase over the past ten or so years. Chile reaches about 70% 
enrollment by 2011, the beginning of the current Education Movement. In context then, 
these numbers make it difficult to understand why Chileans have such profound 
disappointment with their education system if tertiary school enrollment has been on the 
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uptick over the past decade. Thus, the problem must be less about enrollment and more 
about overall satisfaction in the system.  
Survey data supports this claim. In survey conducted by the organization 
Latinobarometro in 2011, 34% percent of Chileans surveyed claimed that university 
education had worsened over the past ten years. Nearly as many (34%) claimed that it 
had stayed the same. Only 20% claimed that it had gotten better, meaning that over 60% 
of respondents had not seen improvement in university education even though enrollment 
had increased. Furthermore, when asked who should pay for university education, over 
90% of respondents stated that either the state should pay for it entirely, or that the state 
should pay more than the family. 1.2% of respondents believed that the family alone 
should pay for university education (Latinobarometro: quien cree usted debe pagar la 
educación unversitaria?). Chileans were also surveyed about whether or not they think a 
university education allows a person to eventually gain meaningful employment, and 
over 80% said yes (Latinobarometro: La formación universitaria permite acceder a un 
buen trabajo). This shows that Chileans also understand the link between education and 
social mobility, but believe mobility through education is difficult to maintain because of 
its high cost. 
The survey data and the raw enrollment numbers reveal the problems with the 
Chilean education system and some of the reasons for discontent. Enrollment has 
increased in Chile, but overall satisfaction with the system has not. Chileans are 
dissatisfied with the education system because they firmly believe that the state should 
pay for university education as it once did. This explains the disparity between the 
increase in university enrollment over the past decade and the development of the 
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education movement; more Chileans are attending university, but these Chileans are also 
unhappy about the price they are paying for it. Since Chileans also believe that a 
university education is a necessary prerequisite for a well-paying job, it stands to reason 
that they would be upset at having to pay large sums of money in order to get a job that 
would lift them out of the working class. Protests, then, could be arising out of frustration 
with a system that makes it difficult to rise through the ranks of society.  
 
Frequency of Protests 
As previously discussed, protests are fairly frequent in Chile. Though the subject 
of the protest and the size may vary, protest as a medium for expression or dissent can be 
used as frequently as weekly. In this section, I will first use the World Value Survey to 
get a sense of how often Chileans participate in various types of political action. Then, I 
will track Chile’s GINI coefficient over the past decade to look for any fluctuation in 
inequality. Lastly, I will run a regression to evaluate the relationship between frequency 
of protests and the level of inequality in the region. 
 The World Values Survey reports that many Chileans engage in some type of 
political action. 37% of respondents stated that they have signed a petition or would sign 
a petition in the future, and 17% of respondents said they have signed a petition recently. 
About 14% of respondents said they would participate in a boycott, or that they have 
participated in a boycott in the past. Most importantly for this paper, 36% of respondents 
stated that they had either joined in a peaceful demonstration in the past, or that they 
would join in a peaceful demonstration in the future (World Values Survey: Fourth 
Wave). Clearly, Chileans are not strangers to protest and are very willing to use 
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demonstrations as a medium to communicate their grievances. Willingness aside, 
measuring protests is a difficult activity. Since most protests occur spontaneously, 
measuring the number of participants or even defining what constitutes a protest is 
difficult. It is even harder when drawing the line between what constitutes a protest, what 
constitutes a riot, and what crosses the line into revolution.  
For the purposes of this paper, I’ll be using the Cross-National Time Series 
Archive distributed by Databanks international for data on the frequency of protests. This 
database compiles several indicators of political violence and dissent along with 
indicators that measure development. I’ll be using the variable “Anti-Government 
Demonstrations” rather than the variables that measure riots or revolution. The reason I 
chose to use the Anti-Government Demonstrations variable is because it describes 
gatherings of people that protest governmental policies, and because it more closely 
correlates with the peaceful demonstration variable I analyzed above. I chose not to use 
the variable for riots because they are definition violent and usually involve a clash 
between authorities and civilians. I chose instead to examine anti-government 
demonstrations rather than measure the variable that describes a phenomenon that is often 
an uncontrolled last resort.  
I’ll be comparing this data on anti-government demonstrations to data from the 
World Bank about Chile’s GINI index over the past 20 years. I have spoken about the 
GINI index extensively over the course of my paper, but to review, the GINI index not 
only measures the level of income inequality in the country, but can also be used as a 
measure of relative deprivation. Unfortunately, the World Bank has incomplete data 
regarding Chile’s GINI coefficient, but it provides the GINI coefficient for roughly every 
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other year since 1994. Where a value for a certain could not found, I have averaged the 
GINI coefficient for the year before and the year after to arrive at a GINI that could 
reasonably predict the level of inequality in the country that year.  
Graph 4: GINI Coefficient in Chile from 1994-2009
 
Source: World Bank Database 
 
As the chart above shows, the GINI coefficient in Chile is currently high, but it is 
not as high as it was during the early 90’s. In fact, Chile’s GINI coefficient seems to have 
steadily declined over the past 20 years. In the early 90’s, in the period immediately 
succeeding the dictatorship, Chile’s GINI coefficient was around 55 to 56, which shows a 
significant level of inequality. In the early 2000s, the GINI dipped by about 5 percentage 
points, showing that income inequality is slowly and gradually decreasing in Chile. 
Though the decrease is only about 5 percentage points, this is significant enough to say 
that Chile is gradually becoming a more equal society.  
This also shows that the level of relative deprivation in Chile is slowly decreasing 
in Chile. Thus, because I hypothesize that protests are high when perceived relative 
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deprivation in a country is high, we can expect that the level of protests has similarly 
tapered since the early 90s. I ran a regression in SPSS using the number of anti-
government demonstrations in a year as the output (y variable) and the GINI coefficient 
as the x variable. Since the database I used provided data for as early as 1950, I chose to 
start the regression starting at 1994 and lasting until 2009.  
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Results 
When I ran the regression, the results were not significant. I believe this can be 
attributed to the lack of variation in the “anti-government demonstrations” variables. This 
particular variable did not show a persistent increase or decrease over the time span I was 
examining. Furthermore, there was not much variation in the GINI variable either. 
Chile’s GINI coefficient only declined for a span of about 4 years, and the number of 
anti-government demonstrations tended to waver between 0 and 1. I believe this lack of 
variation can be attributed to the fact that it is difficult to measure and classify protests. It 
is almost impossible to count every formal and informal march and demonstration held in 
the country. For example, solely in my brief tenure of 5 months in Chile, I was able to 
witness 4 different organized marches that, because of the number of students in 
attendance and the unification of their identity and message, I would classify as a protest. 
I heard of many more occurring in more remote parts of Chile. However, this particular 
database does not reflect how often formal and informal demonstrations are used, and 
cannot deliver accurate results. Therefore, in order to conduct a regression that would 
deliver meaningful results, I would need far more extensive protest data. The results of 
this regression are below:  
 
Figure 1 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
Year >  1993 (Selected) 
1 .117a .014 -.076 .932 
a. Predictors: (Constant), GINI Coefficient Since '94 
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Regardless of the lack of extensive protest data, I ran another regression with 
university enrollment as the X variable rather than GINI coefficient in order to see if 
access to education, a variable with more variation, was a more accurate prediction than 
the GINI coefficient would be. These were the results:  
Figure 2 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .247a .061 .032 83.387 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Anti-Government Demonstrations 
 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) -3.719 11.694  -.318 .756 
GINI Coefficient Since '94 .084 .214 .117 .390 .704 
a. Dependent Variable: Anti-Government Demonstrations 
b. Selecting only cases for which Year >  1993 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 81.632 15.021  5.435 .000 
Anti-Government 
Demonstrations 
7.597 5.191 .247 1.463 .153 
a. Dependent Variable: University Enrollment {1000}** 
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This model did not yield significant results either, which leads me to believe that 
the absence of extensive and varied protest data will make it difficult to design a model 
that will produce significant results. However, the lack of protest data does not 
undermine the overall link between relative deprivation and protests. Many minority 
groups in Chile, united by their common identity and grievances, choose to take to the 
streets to express dissent. Economic (income) inequality may not be the sole cause, but 
coupled with forms of political and social inequality, the reason for grievance is clear. 
Chileans protest because they feel they cannot trust their government, because there is no 
immediate way to close the wealth gap, and because their political history has left them 
with structural problems with no easy solution. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Analyzing survey data and running two regressions led me to believe that the 
relationship between protests and inequality is more complicated than one expressed by a 
mathematical model. Though my results were not as conclusive as I hope, it still allowed 
me to make several conclusions about the state of education in Chile and the level of 
inequality in the country. It also gave me insight into why people protest and why protest 
is considered a legitimate form of political expression.
 I found that in order for protestors to organize and form larger protest 
movements, several factors have to exist. First, protestors must rally around a common 
identity. In Chile, protestors have rallied around the identity of being a student, of being 
part of a minority group, or of being repressed. These groups, once they have identified 
what aspects of their identity they have in common, must then form around a common 
grievance. Organizing around a common grievance is what allows protestors to cross the 
line from thought to action – identifying a problem and believing that only “people 
power” can overcome it is what leads to protests (Meirowitz and Tucker 479). The survey 
data that I consulted also showed that enough people have protested in the past and would 
be willing to protest in the future to show that Chileans believe protests are a legitimate 
way to voice concerns.  
I also learned why the state of the education system has caused conflict in Chile 
over the past decade. University enrollment has increased, but most average Chileans 
seem to believe that it is still cost-prohibitive. A large chunk of the Chilean population 
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does not believe that the education system has improved in the post-dictatorship period. 
Chileans also recognize that education is necessary for social mobility and the attainment 
of a good job, but are unwilling to pay the high fees associated with university tuition and 
believe the state should shoulder the responsibility. Chileans also think that the education 
system does not uniformly benefit all sectors of society. When asked if they believe that 
the education system offers more, less, or equal opportunities to all social sectors now 
compared to five years ago, 37% of those surveyed, the plurality of respondents, stated 
that they believed that it offers less opportunities (Latinobarometro: Comparado con hace 
cinco años atrás ¿cree Ud. que el sistema educativo de su país ofrece más, menos o 
iguales oportunidades a todos los sectores sociales). This means that respondents believed 
that the education system does not offer the same opportunities to the working class as it 
does the upper class. Protestors in the education movement are fundamentally protesting 
for equal opportunities for all Chileans. 
Last, I found that inequality in Chile is more multifaceted than the GINI 
coefficient shows. Ultimately, the GINI is no more than a calculated statistic meant to 
measure income inequality. It is useful to track how income is dispersed throughout a 
country, and it is particularly useful in Chile because it shows how the neoliberal model 
affected country. However, inequality in Chile is also apparent in its social and political 
sectors as well. Indigenous groups in Chile still do not enjoy the same opportunities as 
the rest of Chile. Education is still easier to attain for the wealthy and privileged than the 
working class. The political system and the electoral laws still unfairly protect 
incumbents and can often be confusing. Many survey respondents in both the World 
Values Survey and the Latinobarometro surveys report that they have little confidence in 
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the state and not much faith in the government (Latinobarometro: Confianza en el 
estado).  
It appears that Chileans use protests not as a last result, but as a way to have a 
dialogue with their government. One student interviewed in a documentary about the 
Chilean Education Movement said that he protests because “el sistema politica no daba lo 
que queremos” or “the political system did not give us what we wanted” and that he and 
his fellow protestors must use other means to capture the government’s attention (Chile 
Se Moviliza). Chileans protest as a way to highlight the problems in society, and as a way 
to construct a better tomorrow.  
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